The transitional gains trap

Art Carden and Sarah Moore

Chapter 112 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 791-795 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In a 1975 article, Gordon Tullock explained the transitional gains trap. He proposed it to explain why the “beneficiaries” of government privileges fight to keep them, even when the benefits are not providing them with anything more than the regular competitive rate of return. As Tullock explains, the transitional gains trap begins with rent creation and helps explain why inefficient institutions persist in rent-seeking societies.

Keywords: Transitional Gains Trap; Gordon Tullock; Institutional Change; Inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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