Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Piotr Swistak

Chapter 57 in Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2025, pp 403-406 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: In this continuation of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Basics, we look at the structure of equilibria in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) where players care about future payoffs. In game theory, results that derive these equilibria are referred to as folk theorems. The plural form is used to recognize that the same abundance of Nash equilibria obtains for different instances of IPD. The case of IPD with limiting average payoffs is used here to illustrate the proof, and the meaning, of the respective folk theorem. This is followed by a brief discussion of Axelrod's computer tournaments and some deductive findings in evolutionary IPD.

Keywords: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’; Limiting average payoffs’ folk theorem’; Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma’; Axelrod’s computer tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781802207743
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