Central banks as emergency actors: implications for governance arrangements

David Archer

Chapter 18 in Central Banks and Supervisory Architecture in Europe, 2022, pp 218-230 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Since the Great Financial Crisis, central banks have faced several emergencies, yet only in a few cases do their laws provide explicitly for emergency powers. In many cases, central banks considerably widened their operational toolkits, relying on expansive authorities present in their statutes. How far central banks can go has surprised many, raising questions about the legitimacy of the original political construction, and pushback in some cases. Drawing on debates among constitutional theorists about how best to provide emergency powers, this Chapter considers the potential value of explicit emergency mandates in the central banking context.

Keywords: Economics and Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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