Differences in the fundamental epistemic foundations of problem solving

Bryan L. Bonner, Kathryn Coll, Tyler R. Talbot, Robert Monnot and Jesse Graham

Chapter 6 in Research Handbook on Group Decision Making, 2026, pp 96-123 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: We synthesize epistemic concepts from classical philosophy with the modern problem-solving literature to build a stronger foundation from which problem solving may be understood. Even if team members share the motivation to come to the best solution, they may vary with respect to their perspectives on how that should be done (i.e., their epistemic predilections). These predilections vary with respect to the a priori or a posteriori nature of preferred knowledge and the source of that knowledge (i.e., self, proximal, or distal). The fundamental divide between problem-solvers who are a priori as opposed to a posteriori motivated is that the former believes that a given problem requires only insight (although not necessarily their own), whereas the latter believes that the problem requires evidence (although not necessarily from their own experience). We provide a nomological network for epistemic predilection and show its potential with respect to opening new avenues of scientific inquiry.

Keywords: Group problem solving; Epistemic predilection; Epistemology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035331239
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