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Mellowing with Tenure? Socialization Increases Prosocial Behavior in Public Organizations

Sheheryar Banuri and Philip Keefer

A chapter in Experiments in Organizational Economics, 2016, vol. 19, pp 127-140 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: Recent research suggests that prosocial organizations are likely to have more prosocial employees, and that this match plays a significant role in organization contracting practices and productivity – for example, in government. Evidence suggests that selection plays a role: prosocial employees are more likely to join prosocial organizations. In this paper, we ask whether prosocial behavior increases with tenure in prosocial organizations. Using a unique sample of nearly 300 mid-career Indonesian public officials, we find that subjects with longer tenure in the public sector exhibit greater prosocial behavior.

Keywords: Prosocial behavior; prosocial organizations; tenure time; socialization effect; public officials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620160000019004

DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620160000019004

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