Some Notes on Cournot and the Bargaining Problem

Marc Nerlove

A chapter in Including a Symposium on the Historical Epistemology of Economics, 2017, vol. 35A, pp 179-189 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: The basic ideas of Cournot and those who came after him are related to the recent work of Nash and his notion of an “equilibrium point.” It is shown that the Nash equilibrium point incorporates the main contribution of Cournot to the solution of the duopoly problem and that the major criticism that may be made against the Cournot equilibrium may also be made against the Nash equilibrium. It is then indicated to what use this weakness might be put in the study of bargaining.

Keywords: Cournot–Nash equilibrium; bargaining; two-person games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rhetzz:s0743-41542017000035a009

DOI: 10.1108/S0743-41542017000035A009

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