Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach
Antoine Bouët and
David Laborde Debucquet
Chapter 3 in Agriculture, development, and the global trading system: 2000– 2015, 2017 from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following questions: Which countries are preventing the achievement of an agreement, and why? Is there any way to change the negotiation rules to achieve a pro-liberalization outcome? How can we explain the creation of coalitions, and do they thwart the success of the negotiations?
Keywords: trade; agricultural development; economic development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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