Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach

Bouët, Antoine and David Laborde Debucquet
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antoine Bouët

No 877, IFPRI discussion papers from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Abstract: "We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments' objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain." from authors' abstract

Keywords: trade agreements; computable general equilibrium models; cooperative activities; globalization; markets; international agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000

Related works:
Chapter: Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach (2017)
Journal Article: Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done? A Computable General Equilibrium–Game Theoretical Approach (2010)
Working Paper: Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can be Done?A Computable General Equilibrium-Game Theoretical Approach (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fpr:ifprid:877

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