Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise

Leonid Hurwicz and Murat Sertel

Chapter 4 in Contemporary Economic Issues, 1999, pp 69-88 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The Majoritarian Compromise proposal, aside from its substantive merits, provides an opportunity to illustrate various aspects of mechanism and institution design, and, in particular, to clarify the concepts used in the analysis of design. Many of these concepts also underlie models used in economic analysis. What follows is an outline of some of the issues.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Electoral System; Game Form; Condorcet Winner; Message Space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-14540-9_4

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