Details about Murat R. Sertel

This author is deceased (2003-01-25).

Access statistics for papers by Murat R. Sertel.

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Short-id: pse174

Working Papers

2007

1. The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary
   Working Papers, University of Miami, Department of Economics View citations (1)

2001

2. Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Bilkent University View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2004) View citations (10) (2004)

2000

3. Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Bilkent University View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2002) View citations (15) (2002)
4. Selecting A Social Choice Rule: An Exploratory Panel Study
   Working Papers, Economic Research Forum View citations (2)

1997

5. A Multiplication of Solution Concepts
   ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)
6. Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm
   ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)
   Also in Working Papers, Ohio State University, Department of Economics (1996)
   See also Chapter Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm, Studies in Economic Theory, Springer (2005) (2005)
   Journal Article Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm, Economic Theory, Springer (1998) View citations (8) (1998)

1996

7. Membership in Two Customs Unions
   Working Papers, Economic Research Forum

1995

8. The Changing Role of the State from a Turkish Perspective
   Working Papers, Economic Research Forum View citations (1)

1992

9. A Subgame-Perfect Implementable Social Choice Correspondebnce Failing to Be Nash Implementable
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

1982

10. On Cournot-Nash Equilibria with Exogenous Uncertainty
    The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics View citations (1)

1974

11. Hyperspaces of Topological Vector Spaces: Their Embedding in Topological Vector Spaces
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations (3)
12. On the Continuity of Cartesian Product and Factorisation
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations (2)
13. On the Existence of Noncooperative Equilibria in Social Systems
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    See also Journal Article Existence of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (1996) View citations (3) (1996)

1973

14. (Topological) Semivector Spaces: Convexity and Fixed Point Theory
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations (2)

Journal Articles

2022

1. Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
   Review of Economic Design, 2022, 26, (4), 679-696 View citations (1)

2011

2. The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
   Review of Economic Design, 2011, 15, (2), 147-162 View citations (1)

2007

3. Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, (3), 421-437 View citations (17)
4. Ranking Committees, Income Streams or Multisets
   Economic Theory, 2007, 30, (2), 289-289 View citations (5)
   Also in Economic Theory, 2007, 30, (2), 265-287 (2007) View citations (5)
5. The Manipulability of Matching Rules via Segmentation
   Economic Theory, 2007, 30, (3), 473-491

2005

6. Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (1), 43-73 View citations (12)

2004

7. Core is manipulable via segmentation
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 118, (1), 103-117 View citations (2)
8. Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, 22, (2), 331-347 View citations (10)
   See also Working Paper Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners, Working Papers (2001) View citations (2) (2001)

2002

9. Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2002, 44, (1), 65-83 View citations (15)
   See also Working Paper Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments, Working Papers (2000) View citations (1) (2000)

1999

10. Double-edged population monotonicity of Walrasian equilibrium--a note on the nature of competition
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1999, 37, (3), 235-251
11. Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1999, 15, (2), 149-162 View citations (4)
12. Equivalence and Stability Results for Two Forms of Workers' Enterprise Facing Imperfect Labor Markets
    Journal of Comparative Economics, 1999, 27, (2), 319-333
13. The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, 16, (4), 615-627 View citations (31)

1998

14. Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm
    Economic Theory, 1998, 11, (3), 523-543 View citations (8)
    See also Working Paper Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm, ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica (1997) (1997)
    Chapter Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm, Studies in Economic Theory, 2005, 297-317 (2005) (2005)
15. The Lindahl solution with changing population and resources1
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1998, 35, (2), 151-163 View citations (5)

1996

16. Existence of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1996, 25, (1), 19-32 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper On the Existence of Noncooperative Equilibria in Social Systems, Discussion Papers (1974) (1974)
17. Prakash and Sertel's theory of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems -- twenty years later
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1996, 25, (1), 1-18
18. The trade paradox persists under excise taxes
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 11, (4), 743-759

1995

19. Book reviews
    Journal of Economics, 1995, 62, (2), 227-238

1994

20. Auctioning the Provision of an Indivisible Public Good
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 64, (1), 20-34 View citations (19)
21. Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
    Economics Letters, 1994, 46, (2), 167-171 View citations (14)

1993

22. Two forms of workers' enterprises facing imperfect labor markets
    Economics Letters, 1993, 41, (2), 121-127 View citations (7)

1992

23. Pseudo-experimental estimates of labor supply functions in two Turkish state enterprises
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1992, 19, (1), 83-99
24. The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic
    Economics Letters, 1992, 40, (1), 45-55 View citations (12)

1991

25. A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation: B. Dutta and A. Sen, Review of economic studies 58 (1991), 121-128
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (4), 620-620 View citations (1)
26. Nash implementation: A full characterization: J. Moore and R. Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990), 1083-1099
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (4), 620-623
27. Workers' enterprises in imperfect competition
    Journal of Comparative Economics, 1991, 15, (4), 698-710 View citations (22)

1990

28. Pretend-but-perform regulation and limit pricing
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 6, (4), 451-472 View citations (16)

1989

29. On the continuity of closed convex hull
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1989, 18, (3), 297-299 View citations (1)

1988

30. Characterizing approval voting
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1988, 45, (1), 207-211 View citations (15)
31. Characterizing fidelity for reflexive choices
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1988, 15, (1), 93-95 View citations (3)
32. Choice, hull, continuity and fidelity
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1988, 16, (2), 203-206 View citations (1)
33. Pretend-but-perform contracts in sharecropping
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1988, 4, (3), 397-423 View citations (2)
34. Regulating a duopoly by a Pretend-but-Perform Mechanism
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1988, 4, (1), 95-115 View citations (1)

1987

35. Explorations in aggregating choices
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1987, 14, (3), 251-262

1986

36. Competitive capitalism and cooperative labor management in a dynamic nutshell
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 2, (4), 499-519 View citations (1)

1980

37. On the routewise application of choice
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1980, 22, (3), 423-438 View citations (4)
38. Routes and paths of comparison and choice
    Public Choice, 1980, 35, (2), 205-218

1979

39. Class conflict and fairness in “democratic capitalism”
    Public Choice, 1979, 34, (1), 99-116
40. Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1979, 20, (3), 318-339 View citations (4)
41. Synopses in the Theory of Choice
    Econometrica, 1979, 47, (6), 1367-89 View citations (7)

1972

42. A Four-Flagged Lemma
    The Review of Economic Studies, 1972, 39, (4), 487-490

Edited books

1999

1. Contemporary Economic Issues
   International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan

Chapters

2005

1. Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm
   Springer
   See also Journal Article Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm, Springer (1998) View citations (8) (1998)
   Working Paper Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) (1997) (1997)

1999

2. Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise
   Palgrave Macmillan View citations (10)

1993

3. The Economics of Workers’ Enterprises
   Palgrave Macmillan