The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary
Serife Akin and
Murat Sertel
No 718, Working Papers from University of Miami, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This study examines the manipulability of simple n-person bargaining problems by pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is operant. We extend previous results on the manipulation of two-person bargaining problems to the n-person case and show that in a world where a prebargaining stage is instituted in which the bargainers may unilaterally alter the bargaining problem, bargainers with greater ideal payoffs transform the bargaining set into one on which the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution distributes payoffs in accordance with the Concessionary division rule of disputed property.
Keywords: Bargaining Solutions; Pre-donation; Kalai-Smorodinsky (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2007-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Forthcoming: Under review
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mia:wpaper:0718
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