The Uses, Value and Limitations of Game Theoretic Methods in Defence Analysis

Martin Shubik

Chapter 4 in Peace, Defence and Economic Analysis, 1987, pp 53-84 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract An overview of the applications of the theory of games to defence analysis is given. The important distinction is made between those models of conflict which can be adequately modelled as two-person constant-sum games and those which model as non-constant-sum games with two or more players.

Keywords: Game Theory; Rational Behaviour; Solution Concept; Stochastic Game; Game Tree (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Working Paper: The Uses, Value and Limitation of Game Theoretic Methods in Defense Analysis (1985)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18898-7_4

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