The Uses, Value and Limitation of Game Theoretic Methods in Defense Analysis
Martin Shubik
No 766, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Abstract:
The central contribution of game theory to defense analysis has been a language for the understanding of how to formulate and study strategic or cross-purposes optimization in situations involving two or more actors. It is suggested here in this discussion that two fundamentally different classes of application of game theory to problems in defense have emerged. The first is the application of two-person zero sum game theory to military, primarily tactical situations which for the purposes at hand can be reasonably well modeled in this manner. The second is the application of two or more person nonconstant sum game theory to strategic problems involving threat analysis, crises control and the interface between international diplomatic relations and war.
Keywords: Game theory; war; national defense (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 1985-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Chapter: The Uses, Value and Limitations of Game Theoretic Methods in Defence Analysis (1987)
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