Discussion of Barberà’s Paper

Herve Moulin

A chapter in Social Choice Re-Examined, 1996, pp 46-49 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Strategy-proofness is the single most important concept of the mechanism design problem originating in the literature of the early 1970s, starting with Hurwicz’s (1972) paper. Salvador Barberà’s survey paper gives an excellent account of the lively stream of research on strategy-proof social choice functions in a variety of different contexts. It shows how much we have learned already; my comments are focused on what remains to be learned, implying that the study of strategy-proof choice methods will remain an exciting field for scholarly research.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Free Rider; Social Choice Function; Social Choice Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_4

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