Social Choice Re-Examined

Edited by Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura

in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan

Date: 1996
ISBN: 978-1-349-25214-5
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Chapters in this book:

Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation

Bhaskar Dutta

Discussion of Dutta’s Paper

Bezalel Peleg

Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

Salvador Barberà

Discussion of Barberà’s Paper

Herve Moulin

Foundations and Implications of Rights

Christian Seidl

Discussion of Seidl’s Paper

Gerhard O. Orosel

Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights

Peter Hammond

Discussion of Hammond’s Paper

Rajat Deb

On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues

Prasanta Pattanaik

Discussion of Pattanaik’s Paper

Maurice Salles

Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles

Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson

Discussion of Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson’s Paper

William Thomson

Rational Just Social Choice

Serge-Christophe Kolm

Discussion of Kolm’s Paper

John Weymark

Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice

Kotaro Suzumura

Discussion of Suzumura’s Paper

Kevin Roberts

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5

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