Foundations and Implications of Rights

Christian Seidl

Chapter 10 in Social Choice Re-Examined, 1996, pp 53-77 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract To begin with, recall Amartya Sen’s well-known theorem establishing the impossibility of a social decision function which can simultaneously satisfy the conditions of unrestricted domain, the weak Pareto condition, and minimal liberalism (Sen, 1970). The impact of this theorem ‘on the social choice literature [is] fully comparable to that of Arrow’s (1950) impossibility theorem. The ensuing debate has confirmed for Sen a well-earned reputation as the leading contemporary scholar of social choice worldwide’ (Rowley, 1993, p. 67).

Keywords: Social State; Social Choice; Social Choice Theory; Impossibility Theorem; Decision Issue (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25214-5_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_5

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