Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights

Peter Hammond

Chapter 11 in Social Choice Re-Examined, 1996, pp 82-95 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract When Amartya Sen (1970a) first introduced the idea of rights into formal social choice theory, he did so through the fairly standard apparatus of a Social Choice Rule (or SCR) — see also Sen (1970b). By contrast, especially since the provocative work of Robert Sugden (1978, 1981, 1985, 1986), Peter Gärdenfors (1981) and others on this issue, more recent writers have often preferred to consider game forms. Some of the relationships between these approaches, as well as their advantages and disadvantages, have also been discussed recently by Riley (1989, 1990), Gaertner, Pattanaik, and Suzumura (1992), Pattanaik and Suzumura (1996), Sen (1992), and Hammond (1995).

Keywords: Social Choice; Game Form; Social Choice Function; Strict Preference; Social Choice Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25214-5_7

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