On the Evolution of Altruism

Oded Stark

Chapter 20 in The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, 2000, pp 352-358 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract An example is provided to illustrate how evolution can select for altruism. It is shown that evolution can sustain altruistic behaviour between relatives even in a single-shot prisoner’s dilemma model in which altruism benefits one’s opponent at a cost to oneself, and conditions are derived under which altruism persists and flourishes to the extent that the entire population will consist of altruists. The case presented is of interest also because it illustrates how the distribution of a population by a trait is an outcome solely of the relative payoff to the trait in intrafamilial exchanges.

Date: 2000
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Working Paper: On the Evolution of Altruism (1997)
Journal Article: On the Evolution of Altruism (1996)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_20

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