On the Evolution of Altruism

Oded Stark

No 46, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can flourish in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling and that the probability than an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.

Keywords: Altruism; Evolution; Imitation; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1997-06
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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1294 First version, 1997 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: On the Evolution of Altruism (2000)
Journal Article: On the Evolution of Altruism (1996)
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