Permanence and Innovation in Central Banking Policy for Financial Stability
Michel Aglietta and
Laurence Scialom
Chapter 8 in Financial Institutions and Markets, 2009, pp 187-211 from Palgrave Macmillan
Abstract:
Abstract In the first part of this chapter, we emphasize the adaptability and continuity of the lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) doctrine beyond the diversity of financial structures from the nineteenth century to the present day. The second part deals with the global credit crisis and the analysis of the central banks’ innovative practices during the 2007–08 financial crisis. We highlight that the LOLR’s role is not confined to providing emergency liquidity. It aims to provide orderly deleveraging in the financial system in order to preserve the financial intermediation process. Our conclusion underlines that the crisis management has become global and strategic. It opens the way to a major regulatory and supervisory reform.
Keywords: Central Bank; Hedge Fund; European Central Bank; Treasury Bill; Interbank Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Permanence and innovation in central banking policy for financial stability (2008) 
Working Paper: Permanence and innovation in central banking policy for financial stability (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-10324-5_8
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230103245_8
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