Permanence and innovation in central banking policy for financial stability
Michel Aglietta and
Laurence Scialom ()
No 2008-21, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
In the first part of this paperer, we emphasize the adaptability and continuity of the lender-of-last-resort doctrine beyond the diversity of financial structures from the 19th century to the present day. The second part deals with the global credit crisis and the analysis of the central banks’ innovative practices during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We highlight that the lender of last resort’s role is not confined to providing emergency liquidity. It aims to provide orderly deleveraging in the financial system in order to preserve the financial intermediation process. Our conclusion underlines that the crisis management has become global and strategic. It opens the way to a major regulatory and supervisory reform.
Keywords: lender of last resort; central banking; liquidity crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G12 G18 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Chapter: Permanence and Innovation in Central Banking Policy for Financial Stability (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-21
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