The Agency Theory, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Governance Theories

Alain Finet

Chapter 67 in Handbook of Top Management Teams, 2010, pp 576-582 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Corporate governance has emerged from the necessity of controlling the actions taken by CEOs. For companies quoted on the Stock Market, the question is to make sure that the CEOs’ decision-making process corresponds to a process of wealth-creation for the shareholders. This article presents the theoretical corpus which explains the advent of corporate governance, paying particular attention to the ways in which CEOs can get around the practical details of governance, and hence ensure a high degree of entrenchment which may be detrimental to the company’s shareholders.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-30533-5_68

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230305335_68

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