Accident Law and Markets, Part I: The Unilateral Care Model

Alex Robson ()

Chapter 4 in Law and Markets, 2012, pp 89-135 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Chapter 3 examined situations where transactions costs were sufficiently low to render legal rules irrelevant from an efficiency point of view. If these conditions always prevailed and transactions costs were sufficiently low — and if economists cared only about economic efficiency — then the study of law and economics would not be very interesting (and this would be a very short book!). In such a world, parties would always be able to bargain around the law, and as a result of the reasoning embodied in the Coase Theorem, legal rules would simply not matter for efficiency — although they would of course matter for distribution and for the parties involved.

Keywords: Marginal Cost; Legal Rule; Marginal Benefit; Efficient Level; Emission Trading Scheme (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Chapter: Accident Law and Markets, Part II: The Bilateral Care Model (2012)
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230354944_4

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