Accident Law and Markets, Part II: The Bilateral Care Model

Alex Robson ()

Chapter 5 in Law and Markets, 2012, pp 136-160 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Up to this point we have analysed tort laws under the assumption that the victim cannot take any care. Let us now drop this assumption. That is, suppose now that the victim can also take action (in the form of care or precaution) that reduces expected harm. This situation is referred to as the bilateral care model. The approach outlined in this chapter not only allows us to study a much wider set of situations; the possibility that a second party can affect the probability and extent of harm introduces new complications and also means that legal rules will potentially become more complex.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Marginal Cost; Legal Rule; Welfare Loss; Marginal Benefit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Chapter: Accident Law and Markets, Part I: The Unilateral Care Model (2012)
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230354944_5

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