Fighting for Turf in an Internal Labour Market

Lorne Carmichael

Chapter 4 in Internal Labour Markets, Incentives and Employment, 1998, pp 81-97 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The belief that people will find ways to exploit gains from trade is central to much of economics. Some authors (e.g. Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977; McLaughlin, 1991) argue that unwillingness to trade should be seen as direct evidence that gains from trade are absent. The issue also arises in the right to manage-efficient contracts debate (e.g. Oswald, 1993), and in the difficulty economic theory has in accounting for thework stoppages and other destructive acts that sometimes accompanyunion-firm bargaining.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Rational Agent; American Economic Review; Loss Aversion; Bargaining Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230377974_4

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