The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law

Chisato Yoshida () and Alan Woodland

Chapter 7 in The Economics of Illegal Immigration, 2005, pp 109-124 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract We extend the Bucci and Tenorio (1996) model of illegal immigration by constructing a two-country, one-good, two-factor model, and analyze political issues not considered in their work. We consider the case where capital is immobile between the two countries, as well as the case in which capital is mobile between them. Our main result is that the host country’s government can, under some circumstances, optimally enforce employer sanctions in order to maximize the host country’s welfare under both capital mobility and immobility.

Keywords: Host Country; Domestic Firm; Capital Mobility; Illegal Immigration; Domestic Labor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51488-1_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230514881

DOI: 10.1057/9780230514881_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().