The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law

Chisato Yoshida ()

Open Economies Review, 2004, vol. 15, issue 1, 57-62

Abstract: We extend the Bucci and Tenorio (1996) model of illegal immigration by constructing a two-country, one-good, two-factor model, and use a Cobb-Douglas production function to analyze political issues not considered in their work. We consider the case where capital is immobile between the two countries, as well as the case in which capital is mobile. Our main result is that the host country's government can, under some circumstances, optimally enforce employer sanctions in order to maximize the host country's welfare under both capital mobility and immobility. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: illegal immigration; employer sanctions; optimal enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1023/B:OPEN.0000009425.44974.6a

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