Games

Robert Sugden

Chapter 2 in The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, 2005, pp 10-35 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The notion of spontaneous order can, I shall argue, best be understood by using the theory of games. In this chapter I shall explain how I intend to use this theory, illustrating my argument with a very simple game which provides a useful model of how social conventions might evolve.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Stable Equilibrium; Expected Utility; Pure Strategy; Good Reply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-53679-1_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230536791_2

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