Property

Robert Sugden

Chapter 4 in The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, 2005, pp 58-90 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the previous chapter, I quoted Hume’s claim that the law of property is, at root, a convention that has evolved spontaneously — that ‘arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconvenience of transgressing it’ (Hume, 1740, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2; and Section 3.4 above). In this chapter and the next, I shall ask whether Hume could be right: I shall ask whether, in the absence of any formal system of law, self-enforcing rules of property could evolve out of the interactions of individuals concerned only with their own interests.

Keywords: Stable Equilibrium; Pure Strategy; Equilibrium Strategy; Good Reply; Persistence Time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-53679-1_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230536791

DOI: 10.1057/9780230536791_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().