 Aligning the Board: The Chairman’s SecretNada K. Kakabadse, Reeves Knyght and Andrew Kakabadse Chapter 13 in How to Make Boards Work, 2013, pp 360-380 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Whilst government response to corporate scandal and market failure has been to spawn ever greater regulation and/or comply or explain protocol, it has also been long recognised that a formulaic approach to governance codes limits the contribution and value the board can offer the business (Steiner, 1972). Even the proponents of role duality, namely the combining of the CEO and chairman roles, argue that adopting an over-structured, rules-driven perspective to the governance of the enterprise limits the board’s stewardship of the firm (Charan, 1998). Equally, the champions of role separation (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Lorsch and Zelleke, 2005; Hossack, 2006) acknowledge that keeping the CEO and chairman as two distinct entities is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for board effectiveness. Both the role duality and role separation schools concur that the contribution of the board to the continued future of the organisation is principally dependent on the behaviour, experience and skills of its members. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Board Member; Agency Theory; Stock Option; Board Director (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-27570-7_14 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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