The Secret to Boards in Reinventing Themselves

Ouarda Dsouli, Nadeem Khan and Nada K. Kakabadse

Chapter 4 in How to Make Boards Work, 2013, pp 95-136 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract After centuries of established corporate governance practice and a variety of national (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; UK Codes of Corporate Governance, 1992–2010; Viénot Reports, 1995–99, 2000) and international codes of good corporate governance practices (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999, 2004) it seems that either the regulations are not working or that simply a few powerful elites, such as the Bilderberg group, define corporate faith and the parameters of corporate governance design and debate (Richardson et al., 2011). Thus, it appears that we are back to where we started as captured by Argenti’s (1976) six principal symptoms for corporate collapses: one-man rule; non-participative board; imbalanced management top team; lack of management depth; a weak financial function; and a combined chairperson/CEO role.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; Board Member; Chief Executive Officer; Board Independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-27570-7_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137275707_5

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