Selecting Investment Banks

Philippe Espinasse
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Philippe Espinasse: University of Hong Kong

Chapter 2 in IPO Banks, 2014, pp 85-89 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Once the company and its shareholders have taken a view on how many banks should be appointed, and on their respective roles, it is important that this should not be communicated to those firms immediately. Instead, while the issuer retains the negotiating advantage, a number of elements pertaining to the structure of the IPO can more easily be agreed with the chosen houses prior to them being told about their respective mandates. Were the banks told of their appointment first, then safe in the knowledge that they have secured a coveted mandate, they would team up with each other to negotiate important aspects for the engagement, or delay discussions so that things can only be finalized once their status is more firmly established and they have started work on the transaction. This would make it in both cases more difficult for the issuer to retain the upper hand in the negotiations.

Keywords: Investment Bank; Legal Adviser; Retail Investor; Listing Rule; Pitching Process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-41294-2_23

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137412942_23

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