Forbidding Fixed Duration Contracts: Unfolding the Opposing Consequences with a Multi-Agent Model of the French Labor Market

Olivier Goudet (), Jean-Daniel Kant and Gérard Ballot
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Olivier Goudet: Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ Paris 06
Jean-Daniel Kant: Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ Paris 06

A chapter in Advances in Artificial Economics, 2015, pp 151-167 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The model WorkSim is a new tool of analysis for the French labor market. The two main novelties of the model are that it simulates the gross flows of workers between different states (unemployment, employment, inactivity) on the basis of the rational decisions of individual heterogeneous agents, and that both firms and individuals are represented. The model is calibrated by an optimization algorithm, in order to reproduce the situation of the French labor market in 2011. In the present paper, we focus on experiments dealing with the suppression of the fixed duration contracts (FDC) and we unfold the opposing consequences of FDC on unemployment.

Keywords: Labor Market; Unemployment Rate; Exit Rate; Reservation Utility; Severance Payment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-319-09578-3_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09578-3_13

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