Establishing Effective Intellectual Property Rights And Reducing Barriers To Entry In Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Research

Derek Stovin and Peter W. B. Phillips
Additional contact information
Derek Stovin: University of Saskatchewan
Peter W. B. Phillips: University of Saskatchewan

Chapter Chapter 15 in Agricultural Biodiversity and Biotechnology in Economic Development, 2005, pp 309-328 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Governments face a second-best situation when they consider the appropriate policy for realizing the optimal level of agricultural research. As public research effort is constrained, private research is required. In absence of any effective way of excluding others from using intellectual innovations, a public good problem will exist. While intellectual property rights help to reduce the public good problem through granting market power to innovators seeking to commercialize their inventions, these rights also create deadweight losses. This paper examines the tradeoffs inherent in IPR policies and uses a Canadian example to show how some of the unwelcome effects can be minimized.

Keywords: holdup; intellectual property; licensing; strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:nrmchp:978-0-387-25409-8_15

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387254098

DOI: 10.1007/0-387-25409-9_15

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Natural Resource Management and Policy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().