EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi ()
Additional contact information
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 3 in Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain, 2019, pp 17-40 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter focuses on the possibility that some well-known voting procedures lead to specific types of monotonicity paradoxes in preference profiles that are characterized by the presence and election of a Condorcet winner. Moulin’s (Journal of Economic Theory 45:53–64, 1988) theorem establishes the incompatibility of Condorcet-consistency and invulnerability to the No-Show paradox in voting procedures when there are more than three alternatives to be chosen from. We ask whether this conclusion would also hold in the proper subset of profiles distinguished by the property that a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Our focus is on 20 voting procedures designed to elect a single candidate. These procedures include both Condorcet-consistent and non-consistent rules. The former are, however, only briefly touched upon because their invulnerability to most types of monotonicity violations in the restricted domain is obvious.

Keywords: Elections; Non-monotonicity; No-show paradox; Condorcet-consistency; Fixed electorates; Variable electorates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-12627-8_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030126278

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in SpringerBriefs in Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-01
Handle: RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-12627-8_3