Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

in SpringerBriefs in Economics from Springer

Date: 2019
ISBN: 978-3-030-12627-8
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Chapters in this book:

Ch Chapter 1 Introduction

Dan S. Felsentha and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 2 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 3 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 4 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 5 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 6 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 7 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 8 Summary

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8

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