The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 4 in Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain, 2019, pp 41-49 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter focuses on the possibility that some well-known voting procedures are vulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox even in preference profiles that are characterized by a restricted domain where a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in each disjoint subset of voters but not in their union. Our focus is on 15 voting procedures known to be vulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox in unrestricted domains. These procedures include 10 Condorcet-consistent and 5 Condorcet-non-consistent rules. The former are, however, only briefly touched upon because their invulnerability to the Inconsistency paradox in the restricted domain is obvious.

Keywords: Voting paradoxes; Inconsistency voting paradox; Restricted domains; Condorcet-consistent procedures; Condorcet non-consistent procedures; Variable electorates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-12627-8_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_4

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