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Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 8 in Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain, 2019, pp 89-92 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter concludes the analysis of the 20 voting procedures in terms of 5 voting paradoxes in restricted domains characterized by the existence of a Condorcet winner which at the same time is elected by the procedure under investigation. The restricted domain provides a perspective to how much difference various profile types make in terms of the possibility of encountering a voting paradox. In this analysis we contrast the general (unrestricted) domain with one where the initial outcome is stable. We illustrate the problems involved in the choice of an appropriate procedure by discussing the recent proposal for electoral reform suggested by Maskin and Sen.

Keywords: Restricted domain; Condorcet winner; Maskin-Sen proposal; Social preference ordering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-12627-8_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_8

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