Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain?

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi ()
Additional contact information
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 6 in Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain, 2019, pp 67-74 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The relative desirability of a voting procedure is assessed, inter alia, by verifying which axioms, or postulates, it satisfies or violates. One of these axioms is the subset choice condition (SCC). This axiom requires that if a candidate, x, is elected under a given voting procedure, f, in a profile consisting of n voters and k competing candidates (n, k > 1), then x ought to be elected by f also in such profiles over any proper subset of candidates that contain x and that preserve the pairwise preference relations of the original profile. Most known voting procedures violate, in general, this axiom. However, we were interested to find out which voting procedures satisfy or violate this axiom under a restricted domain assumption where a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile by the investigated voting procedure. It turns out that, obviously, all conceivable Condorcet-consistent voting procedures satisfy SCC under this restricted domain assumption. However, most known non-Condorcet-consistent procedures continue to violate SCC even under the restricted domain assumption.

Keywords: Elections; Subset choice condition; Condorcet winner; Condorcet-consistency; Domain restriction; Preference profile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-12627-8_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030126278

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in SpringerBriefs in Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().