The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 4 in Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2018, pp 27-48 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Focusing on four procedures that do not require the voters to submit full preference rankings over candidates (Plurality Voting, Plurality with Runoff, Approval Voting, and Successive Elimination), we discuss, for each procedure, those voting paradoxes to which the procedures are immune and the reasons for this, as well as demonstrate, with the aid of illustrative examples, their vulnerability to other paradoxes.

Keywords: Vulnerability to paradoxes; Non-ranked voting procedures; Proving by counterexample (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-74033-1_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_4

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