Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
Additional contact information
Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

in SpringerBriefs in Economics from Springer

Date: 2018
ISBN: 978-3-319-74033-1
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Chapters in this book:

Ch Chapter 1 Introduction

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 2 Voting Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 3 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 4 The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 5 The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 6 The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

Ch Chapter 7 Summary

Dan S. Felsenthal and Hannu Nurmi

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1

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