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Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 7 in Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2018, pp 125-134 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We discuss the findings of the preceding chapters aiming at an overall judgement of the relative merits of the 18 procedures in the light of their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes. No procedure is invulnerable to all the analyzed voting paradoxes, but there are differences in the variety of paradoxes that various procedures are vulnerable to. It turns out that for those emphasizing that a Condorcet Winner ought to be elected when s/he exists, the most plausible voting procedures are associated with the names of Copeland and Kemeny, while for those stressing the need to preserve the basic rationale of voting, viz., the participation condition, the most appealing system is the Borda count.

Keywords: Comparative evaluation of voting procedures; Voting paradoxes; (In)Vulnerability to voting paradoxes; Condorcet winner; Participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-74033-1_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_7

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