The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 6 in Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2018, pp 81-124 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study the vulnerability or invulnerability of eight voting procedures (Minimax, Dodgson’s, Nanson’s, Copeland’s, Black’s, Kemeny’s, Schwartz’s and Young’s procedures) to 13 voting paradoxes. The invulnerabilities are explained and the vulnerabilities demonstrated through illustrative profiles where the paradoxes occur under the procedures examined.

Keywords: Ranked voting procedures; Condorcet consistent procedures; Voting paradoxes; Vulnerability to paradoxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-74033-1_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_6

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