The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 5 in Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2018, pp 49-79 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The (in)vulnerability of six ranked voting procedures which are not Condorcet–consistent (Borda count, Alternative vote, Coombs’ procedure, Bucklin’s procedure, Range Voting and Majority Judgment) to 13 paradoxes is examined in this chapter. For those systems that are vulnerable to some voting paradoxes the vulnerability is demonstrated through illustrative examples showing that there are profiles where the paradoxes in question happen when the respective procedures are in use. And for those systems that are invulnerable to some voting paradoxes the invulnerability is explained.

Keywords: Condorcet–consistent procedures; Ranked voting procedures; (In)vulnerability to voting paradoxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-74033-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_5

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