The Risks of Admissible Price-Maintenance Systems for the Effectiveness of Inter-Brand Competition

Dieter Ahlert () and Benjamin Schefer ()
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Dieter Ahlert: University of Münster
Benjamin Schefer: University of Münster

Chapter Chapter 4 in Vertical Price Coordination and Brand Care, 2013, pp 33-45 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract `It is no longer disputed that vertical restraints may have positive competition-policy effects. The negative effects of vertical price restraints are, on the other hand, much more difficult to determine.’ This situation is partly due to the fact that almost no experience with the effect of price maintenance is available, as it has been prohibited in Germany since 1973 (apart from some exceptions). Therefore, one can only speculate or theorise on the impact.

Keywords: Market Entry; Consumer Welfare; Retail Prex; Resale Price Maintenance; Vertical Restraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbrcp:978-3-642-35570-7_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35570-7_4

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