The Economics of Contracting

David Frydlinger (), Kate Vitasek (), Jim Bergman () and Tim Cummins ()
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David Frydlinger: Cirio Law Firm
Kate Vitasek: University of Tennessee at Knoxville
Jim Bergman: Commercial Officers Group, Inc
Tim Cummins: World Commerce & Contracting

Chapter Chapter 5 in Contracting in the New Economy, 2021, pp 55-69 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter, The Economics of Contracting, introduces Nobel Prize-winning economic research that cannot be ignored in today’s dynamic and risky contracting environment and goes to the heart of the economic rationale that underpins every contract. Economics is a key factor in any contracting model, and relational contracting deserves to be addressed through at least three key theories. These three key theories focus on the economic side of contracting with different perspectives, and include contract theory, new institutional economics, and repeated game theory. Each of these three theories brings critical insights into the science of contracting, but none provides a complete understanding. The research and theories of big thinkers such as Oliver Hart, Oliver Williamson, and Douglass North contain essential learnings for anyone drafting contracts in the new economy.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-65099-5_5

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