Focal Points in Experimental Bargaining Games

Andrea Isoni (), Robert Sugden and Jiwei Zheng ()
Additional contact information
Andrea Isoni: University of Warwick
Jiwei Zheng: Lancaster University

Chapter Chapter 6 in Bargaining, 2022, pp 109-130 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The experimental literature on bargaining games is vast and growing. The common thread is the investigation of games in which bargainers reach an agreement that results in some allocation of resources between them. Unlike real-world bargaining, in which negotiations are often multi-dimensional and therefore rather complex, in most experiments outcomes are defined in terms of monetary payoffs to the bargainers, providing participants with real incentives to pursue their interests in a way that is intelligible to researchers. Beyond the major and subtle differences between specific bargaining protocols, most experimental bargaining games have in common the most distinctive feature of bargaining: the multiplicity of alternative agreements (including the possibility of disagreement). The bargainers typically have conflicting preferences over alternative agreements, but a common interest in avoiding costly disagreement. This multiplicity of conflicting alternatives will be the focus of this chapter.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-76666-5_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030766665

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().