Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 10 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 309-358 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we extend the incomplete information games studied in Chapter 8 to allow for sequential interaction. We also extend the sequential-move games of Chapter 6 to allow for incomplete information, that is, at least one of the players observes some information that her rivals do not observe.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_10

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