Game Theory

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

in Springer Books from Springer

Date: 2023
ISBN: 978-3-031-37574-3
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Chapters in this book:

Ch Chapter 1 Introduction to Games and Their Representation

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 10 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 11 Equilibrium Refinements

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 12 Signaling Games with Continuous Messages

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 13 Cheap Talk Games

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 2 Equilibrium Dominance

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 3 Nash Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 4 Nash Equilibria in Games with Continuous Action Spaces

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 5 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 6 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 7 Repeated Games

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 8 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Ch Chapter 9 Auction Theory

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3

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