Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 6 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 151-202 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we switch our attention to sequential-move games. While we can still use the NE solution concept to predict equilibrium behavior in these games, we show that this solution concept would yield several equilibrium outcomes, thus not being very precise. More importantly, several NEs in this type of game are based on beliefs that cannot be credible in a dynamic setting.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-37574-3_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_6

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